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In the introduction to part one of this special issue we addressed the thorny 
question of whether an anthropological theory of value is needed or indeed 
possible at all. By way of a Socratic debate, we argued respectively for one of two 
opposite positions. Ton Otto suggested that anthropology can make a major and 
quite coherent contribution to the issue of value in social theory and he was in 
favor of bringing the papers together from a “history of ideas” perspective, thereby 
tracing how the authors’ varied perspectives and approaches to questions of value 
advanced particular—and easily specified—trends in social theory. Rane Willerslev, 
to the contrary, proposed that anthropology is an ethnographically driven disci-
pline, which can only produce idiosyncratic “antitheories” of value. In Willerslev’s 
view, anthropologists are and should be, primarily, warriors of the periphery—that 
is, “guerrilla warriors,” using indigenous conceptual productions as tactics to fight 
dominant theoretical traditions. The debate reflects an underlying disagreement, 
which runs through the collection of articles themselves, about the place of anthro-
pology in relation to other disciplines and, in particular, whether anthropology is 
primarily theory-driven or ethnography-driven, and whether or not these two ab-
stractions (“theory” and “ethnography”) can be reconciled. 
This debate continues in part two of this special issue, but with new fields of 
inquiry and objects of analysis. The contributions of part one were largely con-
cerned with aspects of value in exchange theory and with the radical comparison of 
diverse cultural structures. Part two addresses the relationship between value and 
action, including actions deemed to occur outside the sphere of reciprocal ex-
changes. Additionally, part two raises questions about what value means for anthro-
pological practice by considering how anthropologists engage with their field sites 
and projects via critique and collaboration. 
 
Developing the value quest ion 
As outlined earlier, both Karl Marx and Marcel Mauss employed concepts of value 
for a critique of the capitalist system of commodity production and exchange. 
Interestingly, their critical apparatuses were based on the same premise of an 
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expected return for something parted with: whether this was in the form of a gift 
given or labor time expended. Yet, as the contributions to this volume show, there 
are many types of relationships that are not guided by a premise of reciprocity and 
should thus be taken into account in order to theorize value formation more 
capaciously. 
Consider, for example, the rubric of “sharing,” which is especially salient in the 
ethnographic literature on hunter-gatherer societies. Sharing is, perhaps, one of the 
most “archaic” modes of exchange (Gell 1999), but it also has a much wider 
application in the postindustrial world of city-dwellers (see for example Rasmussen 
2011). Moreover, sharing continues to pose a challenge within anthropology: is it a 
form of reciprocity or a different phenomenon? In a seminal argument in Stone 
age economics (1988), Marshall Sahlins conceptualized sharing as a “generalized” 
form of reciprocity. Engaging with this argument, James Woodburn (1998) 
reflected that among hunter-gatherers with “immediate return-systems,” sharing is a 
specific transactional mode, marked by little or no expectation of a return. Earlier, 
Nicholas Peterson (1993) denoted this type of sharing as “demand sharing,” thus 
reducing the previous emphasis on “generosity,” and instead stressed the role of 
the receiver, who can make claims on other peoples’ possessions. Recently, a stark 
separation of sharing from other transactional modes has been criticized by 
Alberto Corsín Jiménez and Rane Willerslev (2007), who argue that not only does 
sharing among hunter-gatherers coexist with other transactional modes but when 
stretched to its conceptual limit, sharing may transform into reciprocity or even 
into theft. Likewise, Nikolai Ssorin-Chaikov (2000: 345) has suggested that in trans-
actional modes like sharing or reciprocity, multiple exchange logics are always at 
work, and it would be misleading to fuse them into one privileged mode—that is, as 
“sharing” plain and simple—which, ultimately, smooths over rough edges and edits 
out contradictions. 
However, in part two of this special issue, Thomas Widlok maintains that 
sharing is not reciprocity and muses on the reasons why people share what they 
value even if they cannot expect a return. On the basis of the hunter-gatherer 
literature and his own field research among the San of northern Namibia, Widlok 
characterizes sharing as a complex rather than a primordial cultural phenomenon 
that requires specific social conditions for its execution. Taking “demand-sharing” 
as a prototype, Widlok describes sharing as tolerated scrounging rather than as 
reciprocity or altruism. In Widlok’s view, sharing offers an incentive to rethink and 
revise existing value theories on a number of counts: first, sharing entails a shift in 
perspective away from the utility of specific goods and toward what the human 
environment can afford (and how it can be accessed). In sharing there is no 
deliberate economic calculation of the value of a particular item that is given up by 
a person. Instead, sharing involves an acute awareness—and possibly calculation—of 
the value of maintaining good relations in a group. What Widlok ultimately shows 
is that a fuller recognition of the importance of sharing as a widespread human 
mode of transaction in its own right, different from gift or commodity exchange, 
might have a major impact on how we understand value as transcendental field of 
relationships of exchange. 
The contribution by Rosita Henry, Ton Otto, and Michael Wood broadens the 
empirical field of the value debate by analyzing the transformations of value that 
occur in the production, collection, categorization, and exchange of ethnographic 
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artifacts. The authors define an artifact as a “complex phenomenon, consisting of a 
material thing, its specific documentation, and the stories and theories that give it a 
history” (2013: 35). They find that artifacts, in their social biographies, assume 
qualities of gifts as well as commodities and become established both as public 
goods and as private property, often coterminously. To account for this ontological 
multiplicity, the authors turn to Tim Ingold’s (2012) rendering of material culture 
studies and ecological anthropology as a useful point of departure. In this account, 
things are distinguished from objects. Whereas a “thing” refers to the flow and 
movement of artifacts through social life (of which they are part), an “object” 
denotes the singling out of the thing as existing apart from the perceiver through 
processes of inscription and categorization. The authors argue that value is ascrib-
ed in these processes of objectification, which reflect human cultural projects, but 
the material existence of artifacts as things allows for their involvement in different 
cultural projects, both simultaneously and consecutively, leading to contrasting and 
even conflicting valuations. 
Part two also engages with the linguistic dimensions of value creation. Whereas 
values, as cultural representations, can be expressed in numerous means, media, 
and methods—e.g., through ritual objects and ordinary acts—language is the 
ubiquitous means of expressing what Louis Dumont (1986: 233) termed “ideas-
and-values.” In this issue, the ethno-linguist Alexandra Aikhenvald analyzes how a 
particular language, Tariana, in north-western Brazilian Amazonia, expresses and 
congeals modes of valuation in use and utterance. In Tariana, the indigenous 
notion of “good” is phenomenologically related with actions such as “proper, 
correct, and straight,” whereas “not good” is encompassed by idioms expressing 
“otherness” and “difference.” Foreignness is thus often associated with danger, but 
the desire for white people’s goods has also opened up new semantic fields that 
address the economic domain and its inherent value concepts. Aikhenvald thus 
continues and enriches the linguistic approach to value by focusing not only on 
semiotic valence, but on the (meta)pragmatics of language use. For example, in 
Tariana, fluency and competency in a specific language is highly respected as a 
mark of trustworthiness and genuine moral personhood, whereas code-switching is 
a mark of incompetence and low status. 
 
Action and (re)valuation 
The three contributions discussed above respond to questions of value from 
diverse empirical terrains and do so by expanding on conceptual toolkits from 
existing theoretical domains. However, they also reveal an increasing focus on the 
relation between value and action (in sharing, categorization, and language use), 
and a turn away from more formal models of reciprocal exchange and holistic 
comparison. A focus on the relation between action and value, and in particular on 
value as a way to deal with the significance of social action, is even more poignant 
in the next contributions we discuss. These papers can be linked to a line of 
reasoning that was initially developed in the works of Terence Turner, Nancy 
Munn, and David Graeber. The specific novelty of this approach is to focus on the 
production of value in action and to expand the notion of value production 
beyond its more constrained meaning used by early political economists; namely, 
the production of value through labor. Terence Turner (2008), who places himself 
directly in the tradition of Marxian value theory, argues that this approach to value, 
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when properly calibrated, has wide applicability, even in societies that do not 
engage in commodity production. Graeber (2001), using Turner’s ethnographic 
material on the Kayapo of central Brazil, shows how this can be done by analyzing 
the chanting of Kayapo chiefs as a medium and measure of value. 
Morten Nielsen’s contribution to this issue is directly inspired by this line of 
reasoning. He is particularly indebted to Munn’s (1986) working out of Gawan 
value creation in terms of its transformative capacity to expand or contract the 
spacetime of self-other relationships. His case study concerns young road workers 
in southern Mozambique who are not happy with the pay they receive from their 
Chinese employers. The workers consider this pay as a “handout,” which, in turn, 
suggests a failure—on the part of the Chinese employers—to recognize them as 
proper social persons. At one level, this situation could be read as a passive 
resistance to market relations, where labor is turned into a commodity with a 
price—an exchange value—that the workers cannot control. But Nielsen takes his 
analysis much further. He observes that an interesting value transformation occurs 
in the perception of the workers to their work when they have earned sufficient 
money to buy a bag of cement. Their image of the unsatisfactory employee-
employer relationship is transformed into a relationship between their work on the 
road and the construction of their own houses. Thus, the former social relation, 
marked by its negative value transformation, is obviated (here used in Roy 
Wagner’s sense of the term) by a positive relationship that implies an expanded 
vision of the past and the future. The bag of cement is both a positive memory 
linked to the road work and the anticipation of a future house—replete with its 
implications for kinship and marriage—that also may facilitate the acquisition of 
citizen status. This is, of course, an uncertain future, but it affects the valuation of 
the present, materialized in a bag of cement. 
Karen Sykes’ contribution to this volume also deals with the relation between 
actions and values by investigating how changing economic and kin-centric 
practices entail new kinds of choices and the need for revaluations. Exploring the 
consequences of recent Papua New Guinean migration to Australia, Sykes 
examines—from the perspectives of women—shifting relations between sisters (who 
migrated) and their brothers (who stayed behind). Traditionally, in this Papua New 
Guinean context, the payment of bridewealth established a bond between the clan 
of the husband and the clan of the brother, of which the sister is a part. In the two 
cases Sykes describes, a mortgage (taken to build a house) became a central part of 
bridewealth negotiations, wherein the house was given to the parents to live in, but 
it remained the property of the mortgage taker. Sykes argues that, in both cases, 
the expression of respect for brothers was the traditional value that bound the new 
and old practices together. In this way, market relations were integrated with kin 
relations, but at the same time, new monetary possibilities appeared to affect the 
valuation of brothers by their sisters as the latter aimed to balance their risks and 
interests between transnational households and obligations to natal clans.  
In another contribution, Alberto Corsín Jiménez and Adolfo Estalella focus on 
the emergence of new values in political action. Their particular case is the Occupy 
Movement in Spain, known as the “15M Movement,” having been inaugurated on 
May 15, 2011. This grassroots movement created a space for intensive social 
experimentation in a modern urban environment, leading to the design of new 
social forms and values for a specifically urban setting. Through a form of 
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participatory ethnography, Corsín Jiménez and Estalella were able to follow this 
urban social experiment as it evolved through “popular assemblies”—more than 
one hundred in Madrid alone. What they show is how the work of organizing 
these assemblies was constitutive of a new experience of relationality in the city, 
referred to as “making neighbors.” This new relationality was quite different from 
existing urban relations based on personas such as the stranger, the cosmopolitan, 
and the consumer. It was also fundamentally distinct from the temporal and dur-
able qualities of social forms like kinship and friendship, as the neighbor became 
what they refer to as an “atmospheric” person, created in and through the political 
ambience and experimentation of the assemblies themselves. Their case study 
reveals how social and political value emerges through the design of the neighbor 
as a new social relation, an “idea-and-value” in the Dumontian sense, but simul-
taneously a social value that is produced in and through experimental political 
action. 
 
Value as theory and crit ical practice 
Michael Lambek’s contribution is, perhaps, the most ambitious attempt in the 
collection to provide a general anthropological theory of value. What makes it 
particularly anthropological, in our view, is its “holistic” scope (cf. Otto and 
Bubandt 2010). Lambek engages in a thought experiment where he conceives all 
action from the viewpoint of value. By making this holistic move, he extends the 
traditionally Marxist understanding of productive activity as the paramount source 
of value to include all forms of human activity, even those actions that are deemed 
to lie outside the sphere of material production and exchange. Although Lambek 
does not explicitly deal with Munn, Turner, or Graeber in this contribution (but 
see Lambek 2008), his attempt to theorize the connection between value and 
action is very much in line with their intellectual agendas. Following Aristotle and 
Hannah Arendt, among others, Lambek distinguishes two types of activities, 
namely action and production—or “doing” and “making.” He argues that ethical 
value is to action as material value is to production, thus relating this established 
dichotomy to the question of value. Lambek further links ethical value with 
incommensurability and material value with commensurability. This leads to two 
different kinds of valuation, namely choice in the case of market value, and 
judgment in the case of ethics, where a balance between noncommensurable 
values has to be established. The most innovative part of Lambek’s contribution—
after he set up this useful conceptual framework—is to be found in his detailed 
reflections on how acts, performative ones in particular, can objectify value and 
how this objectified value then circulates in society. The value of these acts is not 
only objectified by the execution of the acts themselves, but also retrospectively by 
the way the acts are narrated. Value can also be stored in sacred postulates or 
verbal formulas, which, in turn, assume authority through their narrative iteration. 
In Lambek’s analysis, objectified value is circulated and sustained by human 
activity and, therefore, can rapidly disappear in its absence. Extending the storage 
of objectified value to things, Lambek argues that the gift can also be brought 
under this paradigm, since the gift is an objectification of the value generated in 
acts of giving, accepting, and returning. Thus, he reasons, a gift is the objectification 
of acts, just as a commodity is the objectification of labor. Within this all-
encompassing theory, however, older theoretical oppositions persist. For Lambek, 
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there is still a difference between commodity and noncommodity spheres, between 
labor and other kinds of action, and, as he explicitly points out, between ritual and 
legal-bureaucratic spheres of performative action. 
Marshall Sahlins’ essay in this issue also makes a strong claim about anthro-
pology’s contribution to value theory and, rather than using “guerrilla tactics,” he 
engages in a full-blown attack on the way value has been theorized in modern, 
neoclassical economics. His strategic approach is organized along several lines of 
assault. First, he demonstrates how the general claim by economists that the 
economy should be treated as a separate system is, in fact, impossible to sustain, as 
the impact of so-called “exogenous factors” is a necessary part of any economic 
explanation. Far from being a self-regulating system, the market is only one way of 
objectifying the cultural-historical order. Thus, by banishing culture as “exogenous” 
to the market, economists also banish a conceptual apparatus, which would actual-
ly be able to explain economic practices. Furthermore, Sahlins effectively demo-
lishes the much-beloved figure of economic thinking—Homo economicus—the 
rational, calculating, and maximizing individual, stripped of all actual human char-
acteristics. Sahlins ventures to claim that Homo economicus, as a matter of 
historical fact, is a fiction, poignantly asserting that the “self is not the sole end of 
an individual’s existence any more than it is the exclusive means.” (2013: 168). 
Sahlins then gives ethnographic substance to his claim by giving examples of 
parents’ love for their children “as other selves of themselves” and a wealth of 
other ethnographic examples concerning kinship relations across the globe. His 
point is to show that material interest and agency, quite evidently, are inherent in 
relationships rather than in individuals. After destroying economics’ blind beliefs 
in the market, rational choice, and the cult of the individual, Sahlins proceeds to 
build up an all-inclusive anthropological approach to value, which he calls the 
“political economy of alterity.” Central to his approach is the ethnographic observ-
ation that, cross-culturally, material goods of the highest values originate from the 
outside, culturally defined, and in particular from transcendent cosmic realms. As 
cause for this alterity of the supreme values, Sahlins points to the universal human 
condition of finitude: key factors of human life—health, prosperity, and death—are 
beyond the powers of human agency; therefore, human societies need to be linked 
to suprahuman powers outside themselves. The value that originates from beyond 
is subsequently appropriated in material goods—thus linking the creation of so-
called “material value” to the cosmological imagination. 
Whereas Lambek’s and Sahlins’ contributions are exercises in theoretical 
synthesis (as well as modes of critique), many chapters in this volume show how 
ethnography can generate challenging questions and criticize theoretical assump-
tions through unexpected findings. This is what we denoted in part one as the 
“guerrilla ethnographic method.” These findings are brought about by radical com-
parison—as discussed in relation to Dumont’s value project and also by detailed 
observations, where ethnographers follow their subject across transnational spaces 
and through various transformations in time. Think of the way Anna Tsing (part 
one of this special issue) followed the Matsutake mushroom along its international 
journey of manifesting as different types of transactions. Or, Henry, Otto, and 
Wood (part two of this special issue), who traced the various value transformations 
of artifacts across places, times, and institutional contexts. In their detailed tracking 
of concrete connections, ethnographers discover that all systems and institutions, 
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however seamless in their self-representations, have rough edges, which, as Tsing 
(2013: 39) remarks, are “a purchase point for intellectual and political work.” That 
is to say, they have value for both theoretical elaboration and cultural critique. 
Here we use the term “cultural critique” broadly, in the sense articulated by 
Marcus and Fischer ([1986] 1999), who see it as one of the two central promises of 
the discipline of anthropology in its twentieth-century guise (the other being the 
study of the diversity of cultural worlds). The aim of cultural critique is to disrupt 
the common-sense experience of our own cultural worlds and to reexamine our 
taken-for-granted assumptions—especially those that inform our social theories. As 
we have already stated in our introduction to part one (Otto and Willerslev 2013), 
an anthropology of value inevitably has to address the aspect of critique—and it has 
done so extensively from Mauss and Marx to Dumont, Sahlins, and Graeber—
since the value concept is intrinsically comparative and evaluative. As an outcome 
of our Socratic debate, we were able to identify two contrasting modalities of 
cultural critique, which we called the “guerrilla type” and the “open battle.” Anna 
Tsing’s contribution (part one) may be seen an example of the first type: she 
generates a fascinating critique of the commodity form (and the system of which it 
is a part) by following the transactions of a particular commodity (the Matsutake 
mushroom) and discovering ethnographically how it is transformed from a gift to a 
commodity and back again. Marshall Sahlins (part two), on the other hand, takes 
the route of an open-battle attack on the taken-for-granted assumptions that inform 
the modern science of economics. He thus demonstrates the conceptual power of 
a theory-oriented, comparative anthropology (that still relies on ethnographic 
particularities as armaments). But perhaps we should add a third modality of 
cultural critique to this militaristic pair: one that unfolds in the multifarious 
collaborations that contemporary ethnographers enter within their field settings, 
including engagements with different scholarly traditions, different modes of 
knowledge production, and practical engagements in byzantine social and political 
situations. The contribution by George Marcus to this volume helps us to envisage 
what this modality might look like. 
Over the past three decades, Marcus has played a key role in coining new 
concepts for the anthropological reflection about ethnography and its potential for 
critique. In his contribution he looks back to the 1980s and follows some of the 
changing forms of ethnographic engagement with equally changing field sites up to 
the present time. In the 1980s, the so-called “postmodern” intervention in 
anthropology allowed for cultural critique to be considered as a rationale for 
ethnographic writing (Marcus and Fischer [1986] 1999). Questions of value were a 
key feature of this movement, if not as explicit objects of study then still as part of 
the critical frameworks that were employed, such as postcolonial and Foucaultian 
perspectives. During the 1990s, anthropology began to rethink its place in the 
context of globalization, which led to a scrutiny of the concept of “the field.” 
Anthropologists usually did not feel the need to declare their projects in normative 
terms, but they nevertheless (and perhaps necessarily) entered into working 
collaborations with informants that involved contests of norms and values with 
uncertain and often messy outcomes. In the last decade, these collaborations have 
evolved further, taking innovative forms that no longer privilege the traditional 
format of ethnography as textual production. Instead, these new initiatives employ 
interactive digital media and various experimental forms of collaboration. A key 
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concept emerging from these new collaborations is that of “third spaces,” in which 
many contemporary ethnographic projects appear to be operating. Third spaces, as 
Marcus defines them, transcend traditional dualisms of self and other or us and 
them by organizing a conceptual space alongside (and as a commentary on) 
fieldwork. Examples include collaborative social-political projects, design 
workshops, or the design of interactive Internet sites. Because these third spaces 
involve the negotiation of contested norms, they forge an “explicit anthropological 
discourse on value.” 
 
Conclusion 
The articles in this volume neither point in one direction, nor do they resolve our 
disagreement about the possibility of developing a truly anthropological theory of 
value. Taken together, a first group enhances anthropological theories of value as a 
dimension of (material) exchange, as well as value as an aspect of cultural compar-
ison (part one). A second group proposes an intensified focus on social action as a 
way of theorizing value and vice versa (see especially part two). So what to 
conclude from our Socratic dialectic on the place of “value as theory” in contemp-
orary anthropology? We see the tension between cultural critique of the “guerilla 
type” and the “open battle” as one of the major contemporary predicaments of our 
discipline, which not only creates an uncertainty of purpose in relation to other 
disciplines but also generates creative energy and critical potential. Moreover, we 
think that Marcus’ discussion of the concept of third spaces provides a way to 
understand how this tension between the two positions may be mediated in the 
concrete engagements (political, artistic, and otherwise) and multidisciplinary 
collaborations that ethnographers increasingly become involved in. Third spaces 
encourage the development of theory as well as its ethnographic challenge and may 
even indicate anthropology’s own “political economy of alterity”—that is, some 
external origins of our own discipline’s value. We wish the reader an enlightening 
journey through this contested space as represented by the remarkable contri-
butions of this volume. 
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